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LSIB/141/55.

10th May, 1955.

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
AMENDMENT NO. 4 TO THE APPENDICES
TO THE UKUSA AGREEMENT
(THIRD EDITION)

Please add the following Note after paragraph 16 of the Introduction to the UKUSA Appendices (dated 1st June 1951):

"On 1st May 1955 USCIB and LSIB agreed that a general revision of the Appendices was required. They further agreed that as a first step toward such revision USCIB would furnish LSIB, for comment, detailed proposals which are being prepared by USCIB. Pending agreement by both parties on a general revision of the Appendices, the Directors, NSA and GCHQ will:

- (a) determine jointly any changes which may be required in Appendices C, D, E, F, K, L, and M and
- (b) implement any such changes which they agree to be necessary.

Although this interim authorization enables the Directors, NSA and GCHQ, to change or interpret specified Appendices by mutual agreement, it does not require USCIB or LSIB to approve such changes or interpretations provided these are within the spirit and intent of current UKUSA policy."


 Secretary,
 Sigint Board.

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 04-08-2010 pursuant to E.O. 12958, as amended. ST56834

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Ref. [redacted]

10th October, 1956.

Director. (Copies to: [redacted])

UKUSA Agreement

... Attached are copies of the UKUSA Agreement and its policy appendices as now informally agreed between the representatives of NSA and GCHQ. NSA will now reconsider these papers and will then submit them to USCIB for the latter to propose formally to LSIB.

2. The factors affecting the need for a reappraisal of the Agreement at this time are:-

- (a) the setting up and development of NSA and the defining of the responsibilities of Director, NSA; this has led to a similar relationship between Director, NSA and USCIB as existed between Director, GCHQ and LSIB;
- (b) the passage of time which has made out of date much of the detail contained in the Agreement.

3. The work in preparing these papers has been done on the basis of

- (a) making a separation as between the technical and the policy material contained in the basic Agreement and the appendices, and
- (b) so redrafting the basic Agreement and the policy appendices that they contain all the matter which is the province of the two Boards leaving all technical matters for mutual agreement between the Directors of GCHQ and NSA.

4. The following are the salient points affecting the papers as now revised:-

A. The Agreement

- (a) It was agreed that it would be preferable to amend the old Agreement rather than to negotiate a new Agreement. The changes made have been kept to the minimum practicable.
- (b) The modernisation of the first paragraph of the Agreement commits the US and the UK as a whole and not only the organisations represented on the two Boards.
- (c) Paragraph 3 is new and has been inserted to define the status of the policy appendices as integral parts of the basic Agreement.

B. Appendix A.

- (a) The new appendix A contains considerably fewer definitions since only such definitions as are required for the

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interpretation of the Agreement and its policy appendices have been included. Such other definitions as may be required for the interpretation of the technical working documents to be agreed between Directors, NSA and GCHQ will form an integral part of each such document.

- (b) The definition of SIGINT refers to both COMINT and ELINT, but GCHQ has agreed to the NSA preference not to make the definition of ELINT a separate heading.

- C. Appendix B.
Comparatively minor changes have been agreed at this stage to meet NSA's wish to avoid raising any controversial issue affecting categorisation which is now under detailed review in USCIB.

- D. Appendix C.
The new Appendix C covers what is appropriate to the Boards of the old appendices D, E and F and most of the old Introduction to the appendices.

- E. Appendix I.
The new Appendix I has been so drafted as to make clear the distinction between the Senior Liaison Officers in both countries who are appointed by and accredited to the two Boards and other liaison personnel and COMINT specialists appointed by the Directors, NSA and GCHQ to meet their own requirements. (There is a possibility that SUSLO may at a later stage not report to Director, NSA).

- F. Appendix H.
The new Appendix H has been so drafted that the detailed content of the annexures to the old appendix become specifically the responsibility of the Directors, NSA and GCHQ.

- G. Appendix N.
The new paragraph 3 of this Appendix has been so drafted that it may correctly reflect both the rather wider responsibilities of Director, NSA and also the co-ordinating function of Director, GCHQ in this context.

- H. Appendix Q.
The new Appendix Q is now a statement of the general principles of war-time co-operation and the detailed planning based in the pre-1954 concept of global war which was contained in the old appendix has all been omitted, including that for the CCE. It was agreed that when present planning activity reaches the point where mutual discussions may be fruitful, plans corresponding to the post-1954 concept should be set up, but as NSA/GCHQ documents.





5. NSA/GCHQ agreement of the new technical working documents.

(a) On the question of how, in future, to record the technical agreements between the Directors, NSA and GCHQ it was agreed that no attempt should be made to over-formalise and that the present direct exchanges of signals and letters should continue. Nevertheless, some series of documents would be advisable, with the devolution of responsibility for blocks within the series to corresponding parts of NSA and GCHQ. Typical blocks would be:-

Research crypt	(H)
T/A data	(J and K)
Division of cover	(S)
Reporting policy	(Z)

(b) Aspects of the old appendices D, E, F, O, H and the whole of appendices K, L and M will all have to be considered for inclusion in this series of technical documents. At some stage in the official exchanges between the Boards it will need to be recorded that these remain in force until agreed otherwise by the two Directors.



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U.K. - U.S. COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE

AGREEMENT (UKUSA AGREEMENT)

1. Parties to the Agreement

The following agreement is made between the United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB) (formerly known as STANCIB, representing the U.S.) and the London Signal Intelligence Board (LSIB) (representing the U.K.).

2. Scope of Agreement

The agreement governs the relations of the above-mentioned parties in communications intelligence (hereinafter referred to as COMINT) matters only. However the exchange of such collateral material as is applicable for technical purposes and is not prejudicial to national interests will be effected between the National Communication Intelligence Agencies of both countries.

3. Appendices to the Agreement

Certain terms used in the Agreement are defined in Appendix A. Additional documents are appended for the purpose of clarifying the agreement, stating the principles of COMINT security, and otherwise guiding or governing the collaboration between the two countries in COMINT matters. The appendices are described ... more fully in an introduction to the appendices (attached hereto).


4. Extent of the Agreement - Products

(a) The parties agree to the exchange of the products of the following operations relating to foreign communications:-

- (1) Collection of traffic.
- (2) Acquisition of communications documents and equipment.
- (3) Traffic analysis.
- (4) Cryptanalysis.
- (5) Decryption and translation.
- (6) Acquisition of information regarding communications organizations, procedures, practices and equipment.

/(b)





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(b) Such exchange will be unrestricted on all work undertaken except when specifically excluded from the agreement at the request of either party and with the agreement of the other. It is the intention of each party to limit such exceptions to the absolute minimum and to exercise no restrictions other than those reported and mutually agreed upon.

5. Extent of the Agreement - Methods and Techniques

- (a) The parties agree to the exchange of information regarding methods and techniques involved in the operations outlined in paragraph 4.(a).
- (b) Such exchange will be unrestricted on all work undertaken except that upon notification of the other party information may be withheld by either party when its special interests so require. Such notification will include a description of the information being withheld, sufficient in the opinion of the withholding party, to convey its significance. It is the intention of each party to limit such exceptions to the absolute minimum.

6. Third Parties to the Agreement

Both parties will regard this agreement as precluding action with third parties on any subject appertaining to COMINT except in accordance with the following understanding:-

- (a) It will be contrary to this Agreement to reveal its existence to any third party unless otherwise agreed by the two parties.
- (b) Except as laid down in Appendix P, each party will seek the agreement of the other to actions with third parties, and will take no such action until its advisability is agreed upon.
- (c) The agreement of the other having been obtained, it will be left to the party concerned to carry out the agreed action in the most appropriate way, without obligation to disclose precisely the channels through which action is taken.

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- (d) Each party will ensure that the results of any of its actions with third parties are made available to the other.

7. Commonwealth Countries other than the U.K.

- (a) While Commonwealth Countries other than the U.K. are not parties to this agreement, they will not be regarded as third parties.
- (b) LSIB will keep USCIB informed of any arrangements or proposed arrangements with other Commonwealth COMINT Authorities.
- (c) USCIB will make no arrangements in the sphere of COMINT with any Commonwealth COMINT Authorities other than Canadian, except through, or with the prior approval of, LSIB.
- (d) As regards Canada, USCIB will complete no arrangements with any COMINT Authority therein, without first obtaining the views of LSIB.
- (e) It will be conditional on any Commonwealth Authorities with whom collaboration takes place that they abide by the terms of paragraphs 6, 9 and 10 of this agreement and by the arrangements laid down in paragraph 8.

8. Arrangements between LSIB and U.S. Authorities and USCIB and U.K. Authorities

- (a) LSIB will make no arrangements in the sphere of COMINT with any U.S. authority except through, or with prior approval of, USCIB.
- (b) USCIB will make no arrangements in the sphere of COMINT with any U.K. authority except through, or with prior approval of, LSIB.

9. Dissemination and Security

Classified COMINT information and materials will be disseminated and safeguarded in accordance with principles drawn up and kept under review by USCIB and LSIB in collaboration. These principles shall be the basis for all regulations on this subject issued by or under the authority of USCIB or LSIB and other appropriate authorities of the Governments of the two parties. Within the terms of these regulations dissemination by either party will be made to U.S.



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recipients only as approved by USCIB; to Commonwealth recipients other than Canadian, only as approved by LSIB; to Canadian recipients only as approved by either USCIB or LSIB; and to third party recipients only as jointly approved by USCIB and LSIB as provided in Appendix P.

10. Dissemination and Security - Commercial

USCIB and LSIB will ensure that without prior notification and consent of the other party in each instance no dissemination of information derived from COMINT sources is made to any individual or agency, governmental or otherwise, that will exploit it for commercial purposes.

11. Previous Agreements

This Agreement supersedes all previous Agreements between U.K. and U.S. authorities in the COMINT field.

12. Amendment and Termination of Agreement

This Agreement may be amended or terminated completely or in part at any time by mutual agreement. It may be terminated completely at any time on notice by either party, should either consider its interests best served by such action.

13. Activation and Implementation of Agreement

This Agreement becomes effective by signature of duly authorized representatives of the parties. Thereafter, its implementation will be arranged between the COMINT authorities concerned subject to the approval of LSIB and USCIB.

For and in behalf of the
London Signal Intelligence Board

For and in behalf of the United States
Communications Intelligence Board

/Introduction to

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INTRODUCTION TO THE APPENDICES TO
THE UKUSA AGREEMENT

1. The following is a list of documents which were attached to, and considered integral parts of, the UKUSA Agreement at the time of its amendment:-

- (a) This Introduction.
- (b) Appendix A, Definitions of Certain Terms Used in the UKUSA Agreement.
- (c) Appendix B, Principles of Security and Dissemination.
- (d) Appendix C, General Principles of Collaboration between COMINT Agencies.
- (e) Appendix G, Exchange of Collateral Material and COMINT Material which is obtained
- (f) Appendix H, Communications.
- (g) Appendix I, Liaison and Methods of Communication.
- (h) Appendix J, Principles of UKUSA Collaboration with Commonwealth Countries, other than the U.K.
- (i) Appendix N, Emergency Planning.
- (j) Appendix P, COMINT Relations with Third Parties.
- (k) Appendix Q, COMINT Collaboration in War.

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2. The object of the appendices is to clarify the basic agreement by stating in some detail the principles of COMINT security and otherwise guiding or governing the collaboration between the two parties. Amendments to the appendices (including the addition of new appendices) will be made as required and agreed by USCIB and LSIB.

3. The technical aspects of COMINT collaboration, i.e. those which do not require the approval of LSIB or USCIB, will be arranged as required and agreed by the Director, NSA, and the Director, GCHQ. Such arrangements will be made in accordance with the principles of collaboration as set forth in the UKUSA Agreement. The object of these technical arrangements is to ensure that maximum advantage is obtained from the combined available facilities of both parties.



APPENDIX A

DEFINITIONS OF CERTAIN TERMS USED IN THE UKUSA AGREEMENT

British Commonwealth^{*}

Collateral Material

Non-COMINT material which is of assistance in the collection or production of COMINT, or is otherwise applicable for technical COMINT purposes.

COMINT

The name given to all processes involved in, and intelligence information and technical material resulting from, the interception and study of (a) foreign communications passed by wire, radio and other electromagnetic means (except press, propaganda, and public broadcasts) and (b) of selected foreign communications sent by non-electromagnetic means.

COMINT Agency

A national COMINT collection and production authority, i.e., in the U.S. NSA, in the U.K. GCHQ.

COMINT Authority

An authority who is responsible for the collection, production, dissemination, or use of COMINT.

Foreign Communications

Communications of the Government, or of any military, air or naval forces, faction, party, department, agency or bureau of a foreign country, or of any person or persons acting or purporting to act there-

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for, and shall include communications originated by nationals of a foreign country which may contain information of value.

/Signal

^{*} USCIB proposes that this definition be drafted by LSIB.





Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) Includes both COMINT and ELINT (ELINT is information obtained by intercepting and analyzing non-communications transmissions).

Foreign Country Any country, whether or not its government is recognized by the U.S. or the U.K., excluding only the U.S. and The Commonwealth.

Technical Material

- (1) Data concerning (a) cryptographic systems, (b) communications including procedures and methods, (c) methods used in the collection and production of COMINT, (d) equipment as used in or designed for COMINT processes;
- (2) information or material related to data of the types enumerated in (1) above.

Third Parties All individuals or authorities other than those of the U.S. and The Commonwealth.

NOTE: Other Appendices to the UKUSA Agreement may contain certain terms having specialized meanings for the purpose of those appendices. In such cases the terms are defined in those appendices.

/Appendix B.





APPENDIX B

Para. 4 -

(a) First sentence to read:-

"There are two types of COMINT end-product: Crypt Intelligence and Traffic Intelligence [See note 2]."

(b) "intelligence information" to be substituted for "COMINT" in subparas. a. and b.

Paras. 6 (b) and 7 -

To be amended as may be finally agreed by USCIB and LSIB.

Paras. 12 and 13 -

Amend second sentences to read (as recently agreed by USCIB and LSIB):-

"Such codewords shall be replaced when in the opinion of either USCIB or LSIB a requirement exists for a change."

Para. 31 -

Insert after first sentence:

"In the case of Allied Commands involving the U.S. and the U.K., the level will be established for each command by agreement between USCIB and LSIB. It is understood that the responsibility thus assigned will be exercised over all subordinate U.S. and U.K. personnel. Exceptions shall be authorized only after careful consideration in each instance of the advantages to be gained, as opposed to the risk involved."

Para. 35d -

Insert after second sentence:

"In the case of allied commands involving the U.S. and the U.K., the level will be established for each command by agreement between USCIB and LSIB."

Para. 35e -

Insert after second sentence:

"In the case of allied commands involving the U.S. and the U.K., the level will be established for each command by agreement between USCIB and LSIB."

Para. 36a -

Substitute:

"Whenever Category I COMINT is to be transmitted by a means exposed to interception, it shall normally be transmitted in an appropriate cryptographic system. When there is no suitable means of secure communication available, Category I COMINT classified CONFIDENTIAL may be transmitted in plain language if there is an urgent operational need to do so. Whenever possible such plain language transmission shall be in the form of operational orders so worded that the subject matter cannot be traced specifically to its



COMINT origin, Category I COMINT which may be classified higher than Confidential may not be transmitted in plain language by a means exposed to interception."

Para. 37b -

Add to end of paragraph:

"In the case of allied commands involving the U.S. and the U.K., the level will be established for each command by agreement between USCIB and LSIB."

Para. 40b.(2) -

Amend last sentence to read:-

"Similarly, the classification (and codeword) need not appear on every sheet of raw traffic and technical material passed between COMINT agencies and units."

Para. 45c. -

Delete "mutually" in line 1.

Note 1 -

To be deleted. Now absorbed in Appendix 'A'.

Note 2 -

To be amended as may be finally agreed by USCIB and LSIB.

ANNEXURE B1

Paras. 3 and 5 -

To be amended as may be finally agreed by USCIB and LSIB.

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APPENDIX C

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF COLLABORATION ON COMINT PRODUCTION AND COLLECTION

1. Arrangements involving COMINT collection and production shall be established by agreement between Directors NSA and GCHQ. These arrangements will implement the UKUSA Agreement and will take effect within the scope and limitations established thereby.
2. The object of these arrangements is to ensure that maximum advantage is obtained from the combined available personnel and facilities of both parties.
3. In accordance with these arrangements, each party will continue to make available to the other, continuously, currently, and without request, all raw traffic, COMINT end-product and technical material acquired or produced, and all pertinent information concerning its activities, priorities and facilities, both present and planned, subject only to the proviso contained in paragraphs 4(b) and 5(b) of the Agreement^{*E}.
4. The conveyance by one agency or unit to another, pursuant to paragraphs 4a(2) and (6), and 5(a) of the UKUSA Agreement, of a device or apparatus, may take the form of a gift, loan, sale, rental or rendering available, as may be agreed and arranged by the agencies concerned in the specific instance. The fact that the disclosing agency may have the privilege of using a method or technique, or a device or apparatus pertaining thereto, on a royalty-free basis, shall not of itself relieve the receiving agency of the obligation to pay royalties.

^{*E}The channel for this exchange will be between the Directors NSA and GCHQ unless they agree otherwise.

/Appendix H.

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APPENDIX H

COMMUNICATIONS

1. Telecommunications Required

Exclusive and readily extensible telecommunications between Agencies, and between Agencies and their outlying stations, will be maintained in order to make possible; (a) the rapid flow of COMINT material from points of interception to the Agencies; (b) the rapid exchange of all types of raw traffic, technical material, end-products, and related material between the Agencies; (c) the efficient control of COMINT collection and production. In addition lateral communications between stations of one party and the Agency or stations of the other may be provided for the same purposes as necessary and mutually agreed.

2. The Director, GCHQ and the Director, NSA will ensure that mutual COMINT communications problems are kept under review and will assist each other as may be required on such problems. They will ascertain communications requirements for collection and exchange, take the necessary steps to see that these communications are provided and keep each other informed of progress.

3. Installation, Maintenance and Operation of Terminals.

The terminals of circuits or channels intended exclusively to carry COMINT traffic between the British Commonwealth and the United States will be installed, maintained and operated as arranged by the appropriate COMINT authorities of the countries concerned, and, although normally such terminals will be installed, maintained and operated by the appropriate U.S. or British Commonwealth authority on whose territory the terminals are situated, this will not be obligatory.

4. Provision of Equipment

The provision of equipment of all types will be by mutual assistance where necessary and practicable and as agreed in each specific case.

5. Cryptographic Aids.

(a) Common cryptographic aids will be used for combined COMINT communications.

The matter of cryptographic aids will be kept continuously under review with the object of maintaining and increasing security

facilitating

facilitating communications.

- (b) In order to reduce the number of personnel required for communication and cryptographic operations and thereby to augment the forces available for direct intercept operations, and also to improve speed and accuracy, the ultimate goal should be the transmission of all COMINT material in on-line cryptosystems. Every effort should be made towards this end, consistent with the policies of both countries.

6. Bag Routes

Bag routes will be kept under review with the object of taking full advantage of sea and air services.

7. Microfilm

Both Agencies will be equipped to handle microfilm so that it may be available for use when it is not practicable to send the original material.

/Appendix I.

APPENDIX I

LIAISON AND METHODS OF COMMUNICATION

LIAISON PERSONNEL

1. Each party shall maintain, in the country of the other, a senior liaison officer accredited to the other. Such officers shall be responsible each in the country to which he is accredited for all liaison matters.
2. The Directors, NSA and GCHQ, shall provide for additional liaison, as may be required between the agencies. All such additional liaison personnel shall be under the control and direction of the senior liaison officer. Upon agreement between the Directors, COMINT specialists may be assigned to agencies or units of either party by the other. In so doing, the Directors shall reach a mutually acceptable understanding on the control and direction of the COMINT specialists. Suitable office facilities will be made available as necessary by the agency to which liaison personnel are assigned.
3. Each party shall normally assist the other's senior liaison officer by making available to him facilities for packaging and preparing material for transportation. Each party shall, to the extent of facilities operated by or available to it, assist the other's senior liaison officer with safe-hand and other transportation within its own country.
4. Liaison officers of one party shall normally have unrestricted access to those parts of the other's agencies which are engaged directly in the production of COMINT, except such parts thereof which contain unexchangeable information. The points of contact of liaison officers within agencies for requests and enquiries shall be determined, established and delimited by the party to which they are accredited.
5. In addition to the above regularly assigned personnel, visits by selected personnel for short periods of time to deal with special problems will be encouraged.



COMMUNICATION VIA SENIOR LIAISON OFFICERS

6. The channel whereby either party communicates with the other shall be the sender's senior liaison officer. The receiving party shall respond to such action via the same liaison officer.
7. The provisions of paragraph 6 above shall not be construed as preventing either party from accommodating the other by transporting or communicating information or material for the other party.

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APPENDIX J

ANNEXURE J1

Certain consequential amendments of the references to paragraphs in the Agreement will be necessary.

Paragraph 6 - Substitute:

"The direct collaboration and consequent exchanges between NSA and DSB will be regulated by pertinent provisions of Appendices C, G, H and I to the UKUSA Agreement, and by pertinent technical procedures which shall be established by NSA and GCHQ pursuant to Appendix C.

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APPENDIX N

ARRANGEMENTS FOR EMERGENCY RE-LOCATION OF COMINT UNITS




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APPENDIX Q

ORGANIZATION OF UKUSA COMINT COLLABORATION IN WAR

INTRODUCTION

1. The UKUSA Agreement (including its appendices) and the operating arrangements based thereon will continue to be the basis of relations between the two parties in war.
2. In interpretation of this agreement the general principles and considerations stated below provide for particular spheres of collaboration between the two parties during a war in which the U.S. and the U.K. are allied.
3. The aim of the two parties is to ensure that the greatest possible contribution consistent with security is made by their combined COMINT effort to the prosecution of a war.

PRINCIPLES OF COLLABORATION BETWEEN

COMINT AGENCIES OR UNITS IN WARTIME

4. Specific U.S. and U.K. requirements and capabilities regarding wartime collaboration between COMINT agencies or units shall be established. The Directors shall maintain in a mutually agreed form a detailed plan for such wartime collaboration. Insofar as practicable, phasing for implementing actions shall be indicated in the plan, including those actions which are in the nature of wartime preparations, and which must be initiated prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Consistent with each party's freedom to establish its own COMINT organization, and to undertake any task relevant to its national worldwide interests, the Directors, NSA and GCHQ, shall consider in their planning the necessity and feasibility of the following types of action:-

- (a) A broad division of COMINT tasks between the U.S. and U.K. organizations.
- (b) The augmentation of one party's resources by the supply of selected personnel and materiel from the other.

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- (c) The integration of selected U.S. and U.K. organizations.
 - (d) The establishment of new channels for liaison or for the exchange of raw traffic, technical material, and end-product between selected U.S. and U.K. authorities.
 - (e) The assignment of working groups of one party to the other party's agencies or units.
 - (f) The participation by either party in the other's COMINT organizations, including the arrangements for operational, technical or administrative control, logistical support, and the establishment and maintenance of communications.
5. Planning for tactical Comint, 'Y' or close support constitutes a special case. Coordination of such planning within Allied Commands will be in accordance with Appendix P. Coordination of such planning outside Allied Commands will be in accordance with assigned national responsibilities.

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Directorate Minute Sheet.

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Reference No. :

D/7707.

6th January, 1955.

Subject : APPENDIX E TO UKUSA AGREEMENT.

Attached is a revised version of Appendix E, effective as from 1st January 1955, which has been agreed between Directors, NSA and GCHQ. Further copies are available on request.

2. The existing Appendix E, dated 1st June 1951, is replaced by this new version, with immediate effect, but should not be destroyed pending formal USCIB-ISIB agreement on the revision.

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DA.

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Directorate Minute Sheet.

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Amendment No. 4 completed.

Amendment No. 5 completed 17/6/60.

17/6/60.

Reference No. D/0167.

5th July, 1956.

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Subject : Amendments to Appendix E to UKUSA Agreement.

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APPENDIX E

CO-ORDINATION OF, AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION
ON, CRYPTANALYSIS AND ASSOCIATED TECHNIQUES

ALLOCATION OF TASKS

1. Allocation of major tasks, conferring a one-sided responsibility, is undesirable and impracticable as a main principle; however, in order that the widest possible cover of foreign cypher communications be achieved, the Comint Agencies of the two parties shall exchange proposals for the elimination of duplication. In addition, collaboration between those Agencies will take the form of suggestion and mutual arrangement as to the undertaking of new tasks and changes in status of old tasks.

2. Notwithstanding any informal allocations based on the above, all raw traffic shall continue to be exchanged except in cases where one or the other party agrees to forgo its conv.

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APPENDIX E

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APPENDIX E

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APPENDIX H - sheet 1

APPENDIX H
COMMUNICATIONS

(For details See Annexure H1)

1. TELECOMMUNICATIONS REQUIRED

Exclusive and readily extensible telecommunications between Agencies, and between Agencies and their outlying stations, will be maintained in order to make possible the rapid flow of all types of raw traffic from the points of interception to the several Agencies; the rapid exchange of all types of raw traffic, technical matter and Communication Intelligence between the Agencies; and the efficient control of interception coverage. In addition lateral communications between stations of one party and Agencies or stations of the other may be provided for the same purposes as necessary and mutually agreed.

2. INSTALLATION, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF TERMINALS

The terminals of circuits or channels intended exclusively to carry Comint traffic between the British Commonwealth and the United States will be installed, maintained and operated as arranged by the appropriate Comint Authorities of the countries concerned and, although normally such terminals will be installed, maintained and operated by the appropriate U.S or British Commonwealth authority on whose territory the terminals are situated, this will not be obligatory.

3. PROVISION OF EQUIPMENT

The provision of equipment of all types will be by mutual assistance where necessary and practicable and as agreed in each specific case.

4. CRYPTOGRAPHIC AIDS

(a) Common cryptographic aids will be used for combined Comint communications. The matter of cryptographic aids will be kept continuously under review with the object of maintaining and increasing security and of facilitating communications.

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(b) .In order to reduce the number of personnel required for communication and cryptographic operations and thereby to augment the forces available for direct intercept operations, and also to improve speed and accuracy, the ultimate goal should be the transmission of all Comint material in on-line cryptosystems. Every effort should be made towards this end, consistent with the policies of the services of both countries.

5. BAG ROUTES

Bag routes will be kept under review with the object of taking full advantage of sea and air services.

6. MICROFILM

All agencies will be equipped to handle microfilm so that it may be available for use when it is not practicable to send the original material.

7. COMMUNICATIONS LIAISON

A representative of the Director, GCHQ, and a representative of the Director, National Security Agency, will be given the specific duty of keeping under review Comint communications problems and of raising and advising on such problems as they occur.

8. COMMUNICATION REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED BY OTHER APPENDICES

It is agreed that when all appendices which impose a communication requirement are approved by Comint authorities of all parties to the proposed Comint Conference, the communications annexures appended thereto will be included in Appendix H and made object of such action as is necessary to fulfill their requirements.

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APPENDIX H
Annexure H₁ - sheet 1.

APPENDIX H

ANNEXURE H₁

WORKING ARRANGEMENTS REACHED AT THE 1953 CONFERENCE FOR
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF APPENDIX H (COMMUNICATIONS)



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
APPENDIX H
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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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APPENDIX J

PRINCIPLES OF UKUSA COLLABORATION WITH COMMONWEALTH
COUNTRIES OTHER THAN THE U.K.

INTRODUCTION

1. This Appendix records the general principles governing UKUSA Comint collaboration with Commonwealth countries (other than the U.K.) and certain agreements that have been made on Comint policy affecting those countries. For convenience and clarity, certain of the provisions of the U.K.-U.S. Communication Intelligence Agreement, 1946, are incorporated (in paragraphs 2 to 6 below).

GENERAL

2. While Commonwealth countries other than the U.K. are not parties to the U.K.-U.S. Comint agreement, they will not be regarded as Third Parties.
3. L.S.I.B. will, however, keep U.S.C.I.B. informed of any arrangements or proposed arrangements with other Commonwealth agencies.
4. U.S.C.I.B. will make no arrangements with any Commonwealth agency, other than Canadian, except through or with the prior approval of L.S.I.B.
5. As regards Canada, U.S.C.I.B. will complete no arrangements with any agency therein without first obtaining the views of L.S.I.B.
6. It will be conditional on any Commonwealth agencies with whom collaboration takes place that they abide by the terms of paras. 5, 8 and 9 of the U.K.-U.S. Comint agreement and by the arrangements laid down in para. 7 thereof.

ARRANGEMENTS WITH UKUSA-COLLABORATING COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES

7. At this time only Canada, Australia and New Zealand will be regarded as UKUSA-collaborating Commonwealth countries. In interpretation of para. 3 above L.S.I.B. will not initiate or pursue Comint arrangements with Commonwealth countries other than Canada, Australia and New Zealand (with each of which the L.S.I.B. already has such arrangements) without first obtaining the views of U.S.C.I.B.

8. It is noted that L.S.I.B. has obtained from the Comint authorities of Canada, Australia and New Zealand formal assurances that they will abide by the terms of paras. 5, 8 and 9 of the U.K.-U.S. Comint Agreement and of para. 7 of Appendix E thereto. It is also noted that a prerequisite of Comint collaboration by the U.K. with Canada, Australia and New Zealand was an unequivocal acceptance by those countries of the provisions of the "Explanatory Instructions and Regulations concerning the handling of Signal Intelligence (IRSIG)"^{*} countries, and that continued U.K. Comint collaboration with those countries is dependent on their adherence to the provisions of those regulations.

*
*That such acceptance has been given by the Comint
 authorities of those - - - etc* 19....

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9. U.S.C.I.B. and L.S.I.B. agree:

- (a) not to pass to a collaborating Commonwealth country Comint items originated by agencies of the other party without the consent of that party, except as may be agreed from time to time;
- (b) to pass to collaborating Commonwealth countries, via agreed Comint channels, only such technical Comint materials as are deemed to be relevant to the tasks of the Commonwealth agencies concerned or as may be otherwise agreed between the two parties from time to time; the relevance of technical Comint materials to the tasks of those Commonwealth agencies shall be determined by the Director G.C.H.Q. or the Director N.S.A.; relevant materials shall then be releasable subject to whatever restrictions may be specified by the agency which produced the material (i.e. G.C.H.Q. or N.S.A.).

UKUSA ARRANGEMENTS AFFECTING AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND

Agreed arrangements affecting Australia and New Zealand are contained in Annexure J1 hereto.

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EIDERAPPENDIX JANNEXURE J1UKUSA ARRANGEMENTS AFFECTING AUSTRALIA ANDNEW ZEALAND

1. It is noted that Defence Signals Branch Melbourne (D.S.B.) is, in contrast to Communications Branch Ottawa, not a purely national centre. It is and will continue to be a joint U.K. - Australian - New Zealand organization, manned by an integrated staff. It is a civilian organization under the Australian Department of Defence and undertakes Comint tasks as agreed between the Comint governing authorities of Australia and New Zealand on the one hand and L.S.I.B. on the other. On technical matters only, control is exercised by Government Communications Headquarters on behalf of L.S.I.B.

2. G.C.H.Q. will keep N.S.A. informed of the tasks that have been agreed for D.S.B. and will notify N.S.A. in advance before any new or altered task is agreed for D.S.B.

3. N.S.A. and D.S.B. will collaborate directly on those D.S.B. tasks which, as determined by N.S.A., fall within the field of collaboration and will exchange raw material, technical material and end product of these tasks. In addition N.S.A. will provide D.S.B. with raw material technical material and end product as appropriate on other tasks determined by N.S.A. to be relevant to the tasks of D.S.B. A list of tasks under both these heads will be maintained currently by N.S.A. and G.C.H.Q.

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4. N.S.A. and D.S.B. will also exchange technical interception data relating to the General Search effort of each in the

5. Exchanges between N.S.A. and D.S.B. under the above paragraphs will be complete in scope but in special circumstances each agency will have the right to withhold material at its discretion.

6. The direct collaboration and consequent exchanges between N.S.A. and D.S.B. will be regulated by the provisions of the following appendices to the UKUSA agreement; C, D, E, F, G, H, I, L, M.

7. It is noted that, in interpretation of Appendix I to the UKUSA agreement, N.S.A. has accredited liaison officers to D.S.B. and that D.S.B. will accredit a liaison officer or officers to N.S.A. when it is in a position to do so.


8. It is further noted that, in interpretation of Appendix I to the UKUSA agreement, U.S.C.I.B. will possibly decide at some future date to modify the terms of reference for the senior liaison officer now accredited to D.S.B., whereby he will be the senior U.S. representative for conduction liaison with Australia and New Zealand and, as may be agreed by L.S.I.B., with U.K. officials in those countries, on matters pertaining to Comint.

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19 March 1953

Appendix (N)

ARRANGEMENTS FOR EMERGENCY RE-LOCATION OF COMINT UNITS



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
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Appendix (N)

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
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
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APPENDIX 'N'

ANNEXURE N1


RE-LOCATION OF U.S. AND U.K. COMINT UNITS



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19 March 1953



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19 March 1953

APPENDIX 'N'
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Exhibit I Sheet 1

APPENDIX N

Annexure N1

Exhibit 1

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19 March 1953

Exhibit 1 Sheet 2

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Exhibit I Sheet 3


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Exhibit I Sheet 4



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Exhibit 1 Sheet 5

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REVIEW OF APPENDIX O WITH REFERENCE TO

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
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
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