Difference between revisions of "AE"
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= Articles / Events / Situations = | = Articles / Events / Situations = | ||
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| + | |20150710||wikileaks.org||[https://wikileaks.org/hackingteam/emails/emailid/144932 HACKINGTEAM: /etc/LISTA.txt]||[[HACKINGTEAM]] / [[US]] / [[NL]] / [[BY]] / [[MY]] / [[TR]] / [[SA]] / [[KW]] / [[IN]] / [[ID]] / [[AE]] / [[GR]] / [[SG]] / [[CZ]] / [[IT]] / [[DE]] / [[FR]] / [[NO]] / [[RS]] / [[CY]] / [[LT]] / [[ZA]] / [[HU]] / [[PL]] / [[DK]] / [[NZ]] / [[ZW]] / [[SI]] / [[KR]] / [[VA]] / [[CH]] / [[ES]] / [[CA]] / [[MT]] / [[UY]] / [[VN]] / [[BG]] / [[KZ]] / [[MO]] / [[HR]] / [[GT]] / [[QA]] / [[AT]] / [[SB]] / [[JP]] / [[RO]] / [[NA]] / [[FI]] / [[SE]] / [[RU]] / [[BN]] / [[LB]] / [[GH]] | ||
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== 2014 == | == 2014 == | ||
Revision as of 20:36, 11 July 2015
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
Intel Environment
| Military Alliance | |
| Interior Intelligence Services | |
| Exterior Intelligence Services | |
| Military Intelligence Services | |
| SIGINT/COMINT Alliances |
Telco/Carrier/ISP Environment
| Type | Name | Ownership | Main Office | URL | Notes |
| 3G 2100 | Emirates Integrated Telecommunications Company PJSC (du) | http://www.du.ae/ | |||
| GSM 900/1800 | Emirates Integrated Telecommunications Company PJSC (du) | http://www.du.ae/ | |||
| 3G 2100 | Emirates Telecom Corp-ETISALAT | (AE) | http://www.etisalat.ae/ | ||
| GSM 900 | Emirates Telecom Corp-ETISALAT (ETISALAT) | (AE) | http://www.etisalat.ae/ |
Transnational Cables and Connections
| Type | Name | Ownership | Connecting Point A | Connection Points B | URL/Notes |
| 3,84 Tbs | EIG | Tripoli (LY) / Abu Talat (EG) / Al Fujaurah (AE) / Barka (OM) / Djibouti (DJ) / Gibraltar (Gibraltar) / Jeddah (SA) / London (GB) / Marseille (FR) / Monaco (MC) / Mumbai (IN) / Sesimbra (PT) / Widemouth Bay (GB) / Zaferana (EG) | Operator WP | ||
| 480 Gbits/s | SEA-ME-WE-3 | Norden (DE) / Oostende (BE) / Goonhilly (GB) / Penmarch (FR) / Sesimbra (PT) / Tetuan (MA) / Mazara del Vallo (IT) / Chania (GR) / Marmaris (TR) / Yeroskipou (CY) / Alexandria (EG) / Suez (EG) / Jeddah (SA) / Djibouti (DJ) / Muscat (OM) / Fujairah (AE) / Karachi (PK) / Mumbai (IN) / Cochin (IN) / Mount Lavinia (LK) / Pyapon (MM) / Satun (TH) / Penang, (MY) (Where it meets the SAFE and the FLAG cables.) / Medan (IN) / Tuas (SG) / Jakarta (IN) / Perth (AU) / Mersing (MY) / Tungku (BN) / Da Nang (VN) / Batangas (PH) / Taipa (MO) / Deep Water Bay (HK) / Shantou (CN) / Fangshan (TW) / Toucheng (TW) / Shanghai (CN) / Keoje (KR) / Okinawa, (JP) | WP | ||
| 1,28 Tbs | SEA-ME-WE_4 | Al Fujaurah (AE) / Alexandria ((EG) / Annaba (DZ) / Bizerte (TN)
Chennai (Madras) (IN) / Colombo (LK) / Cox's Bazaar (BD) / Jeddah (SA) / Karachi (PK) / Malacca Town (MY) / Marseille (FR) / Mumbai (IN) / Palermo (IT) / Satun (TH) / Suez (EG) / Tuas (SG) || Operator WP |
SIGINT/COMINT Stations and Operators
| Name | Active | Operator | Location | Details |
| Abu Dhabi | Y | US Special Collection Service (SCS) | Abu Dhabi (UNITED ARAB EMIRATES) | US Embassy Abu Dhabi |
| Az-Zarqa | ? | Contractor-operated US facility. | Az-Zarga | |
| Dalma | ? | Contractor-operated US facility. | Dalma | |
| Ras al-Khaimah | ? | Contractor-operated US facility. | Ras al-Khaimah | |
| Sir Abu Nuayr Island | ? | Contractor-operated US facility. | Sir Abu Nuayr Island |
Privacy Related Legislation
LI Legislation
SIGINT/COMINT Legal Grounds
Vendor Appearance
Vendor with place of registration in the Arab Emirates
Vendor with product/service appearances in the Arab Emirates
- BLUECOAT in 10/2011
- NETSWEEPER 08/2011
- SS8 07/2009
- 2013: GAMMA / FINFISHER see Citizenlab Report 20130430
- 2013: HACKINGTEAM see securelist.com Report 20130425
Articles / Events / Situations
2015
| Date | Source | Title | Tags |
| 20150710 | wikileaks.org | HACKINGTEAM: /etc/LISTA.txt | HACKINGTEAM / US / NL / BY / MY / TR / SA / KW / IN / ID / AE / GR / SG / CZ / IT / DE / FR / NO / RS / CY / LT / ZA / HU / PL / DK / NZ / ZW / SI / KR / VA / CH / ES / CA / MT / UY / VN / BG / KZ / MO / HR / GT / QA / AT / SB / JP / RO / NA / FI / SE / RU / BN / LB / GH |
2014
2013
2012
| Date | Source | Title | Tags |
| 20121010 | citizenlab.org | Backdoors are Forever: Hacking Team and the Targeting of Dissent? | HACKINGTEAM / AE |
| 08.08.2012 | bloomberg.com | FinFisher Spyware Reach Found On Five Continents: Report | FINFISHER / AU / CZ / AE / ET / EE / ID / LV / MN / QA / US |
| 08.08.2012 | community.rapid7.com | Analysis of the FinFisher Lawful Interception Malware | FINFISHER / AU / CZ / AE / ET / EE / ID / LV / MN / QA / US |
2011
| Date | Source | Title | Tags |
| 30.10.2011 | Spiegel | Verbotene Exporte: Syriens Regime überwacht Internet mit US-Technik | SY AE BH QA BLUECOAT |
| 29.10.2011 | Wall Street Journal | U.S. Firm Acknowledges Syria Uses Its Gear to Block Web | AE BH QA SY BLUECOAT |
2010
| Date | Source | Title | Tags |
| 08.10.2010 | Spiegel | Vereinigte Arabische Emirate: Blackberry-Nutzer dürfen weitermailen | AE BLACKBERRY |
| 07.09.2010 | Golem | VEREINIGTE ARABISCHE EMIRATE: USA nutzen Blackberry-Daten zur Spionage | AE Blackberry |
2009
| Date | Source | Title | Tags |
| 06.08.2009 | Cablesearch | SUBJECT: UAE SPYWARE GOES PUBLIC | AE BLACKBERRY |
| 01.08.2010 | Spiegel | Sicherheitsbedenken: Arabische Staaten wollen Datenübertragung per Blackberry sperren | AE BLACKBERRY |
| 15.07.2009 | www.veracode.com | BlackBerry Spyware Dissected | SS8 BLACKBERRY AE Spyware |
| 14.07.2009 | itp.net | Etisalat’s BlackBerry patch designed for surveillance | SS8 BLACKBERRY AE Spyware |
| 14.07.2009 | The Register | BlackBerry update bursting with spyware: Official snooping suspected in UAE | BLACKBERRY AE Spyware |
2008
| Date | Source | Title | Tags |
| 04.02.2008 | khaleejtimes.com | Cable damage hits one million Internet users in UAE | AE FAE SEA-ME-WE 4 |
