Difference between revisions of "SA"
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|- | |- | ||
|Type||Name||Ownership||Main Office||URL||Notes | |Type||Name||Ownership||Main Office||URL||Notes | ||
+ | |- | ||
+ | |GSM 900 ||Etihad Etisalat Company (Mobily)||Etisalat|| | ||
+ | |- | ||
+ | |3G 2100||Etihad Etisalat Company (Mobily)||Etisalat|| | ||
+ | |- | ||
+ | |GSM 900/1800||MTC Saudi Arabia (Zain Saudi Arabia)||Zain | ||
+ | |- | ||
+ | |3G 2100||MTC Saudi Arabia (Zain Saudi Arabia)||Zain | ||
+ | |- | ||
+ | |GSM 900||Saudi Telecom Company (STC)|| | ||
+ | |- | ||
+ | |3G 2100||Saudi Telecom Company (STC)|| | ||
+ | |- | ||
+ | |TD-LTE 2300||Saudi Telecom Company (STC)|| | ||
|- | |- | ||
|} | |} | ||
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|3,84 Tbs||EIG|| || ||Tripoli ([[LY]]) / Abu Talat ([[EG]]) / Al Fujaurah ([[AE]]) / Barka ([[OM]]) / Djibouti ([[DJ]]) / Gibraltar ([[GI]]) / Jeddah ([[SA]]) / London ([[GB]]) / Marseille ([[FR]]) / Monaco ([[MC]]) / Mumbai ([[IN]]) / Sesimbra ([[PT]]) / Widemouth Bay ([[GB]]) / Zaferana ([[EG]]) || [http://europeindiagateway.com/ Operator] [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EIG_(cable_system) WP] | |3,84 Tbs||EIG|| || ||Tripoli ([[LY]]) / Abu Talat ([[EG]]) / Al Fujaurah ([[AE]]) / Barka ([[OM]]) / Djibouti ([[DJ]]) / Gibraltar ([[GI]]) / Jeddah ([[SA]]) / London ([[GB]]) / Marseille ([[FR]]) / Monaco ([[MC]]) / Mumbai ([[IN]]) / Sesimbra ([[PT]]) / Widemouth Bay ([[GB]]) / Zaferana ([[EG]]) || [http://europeindiagateway.com/ Operator] [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EIG_(cable_system) WP] | ||
|- | |- | ||
− | |480 Gbits/s||SEA-ME-WE-3|| || ||Norden ([[DE]]) / Oostende ([[BE]]) / Goonhilly ([[GB]]) / Penmarch ([[FR]]) / Sesimbra ([[PT]]) / Tetuan ([[MA]]) / Mazara del Vallo ([[IT]]) / Chania ([[GR]]) / Marmaris ([[TR]]) / Yeroskipou ([[CY]]) / Alexandria ([[EG]]) / Suez ([[EG]]) / Jeddah ([[SA]]) / Djibouti ([[DJ]]) / Muscat ([[OM]]) / Fujairah ([[AE]]) / Karachi ([[PK]]) / Mumbai ([[IN]]) / Cochin ([[IN]]) / Mount Lavinia ([[LK]]) / Pyapon ([[MM]]) / Satun ([[TH]]) / Penang, ([[MY]]) (Where it meets the SAFE and the FLAG cables.) / Medan ([[IN]]) / Tuas ([[SG]]) / Jakarta ([[IN]]) / Perth ([[AU]]) / Mersing ([[MY]]) / Tungku ([[BN]]) / Da Nang ([[VN]]) / Batangas ([[PH]]) / Taipa | + | |480 Gbits/s||SEA-ME-WE-3|| || ||Norden ([[DE]]) / Oostende ([[BE]]) / Goonhilly ([[GB]]) / Penmarch ([[FR]]) / Sesimbra ([[PT]]) / Tetuan ([[MA]]) / Mazara del Vallo ([[IT]]) / Chania ([[GR]]) / Marmaris ([[TR]]) / Yeroskipou ([[CY]]) / Alexandria ([[EG]]) / Suez ([[EG]]) / Jeddah ([[SA]]) / Djibouti ([[DJ]]) / Muscat ([[OM]]) / Fujairah ([[AE]]) / Karachi ([[PK]]) / Mumbai ([[IN]]) / Cochin ([[IN]]) / Mount Lavinia ([[LK]]) / Pyapon ([[MM]]) / Satun ([[TH]]) / Penang, ([[MY]]) (Where it meets the SAFE and the FLAG cables.) / Medan ([[IN]]) / Tuas ([[SG]]) / Jakarta ([[IN]]) / Perth ([[AU]]) / Mersing ([[MY]]) / Tungku ([[BN]]) / Da Nang ([[VN]]) / Batangas ([[PH]]) / Taipa ([[MO]]) / Deep Water Bay ([[HK]]) / Shantou ([[CN]]) / Fangshan ([[TW]]) / Toucheng ([[TW]]) / Shanghai ([[CN]]) / Keoje ([[KR]]) / Okinawa, ([[JP]])||[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SEA-ME-WE_3 WP] |
|- | |- | ||
|} | |} | ||
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= Vendor Appearance = | = Vendor Appearance = | ||
+ | |||
+ | * 2013: [[HACKINGTEAM]] see securelist.com Report 20130425 | ||
= Articles / Events / Situations = | = Articles / Events / Situations = | ||
+ | |||
+ | == 2021 == | ||
+ | |||
+ | {|border=1 | ||
+ | |- | ||
+ | |Date||Souce||Title||Tags | ||
+ | |- | ||
+ | |20210718||theguardian.com||[https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jul/18/nso-spyware-used-to-target-family-of-jamal-khashoggi-leaked-data-shows-saudis-pegasus Saudis behind NSO spyware attack on Jamal Khashoggi’s family, leak suggests]||[[NSO]] / [[SA]] | ||
+ | |- | ||
+ | |20210718||zeit.de||[https://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2021-07/jamal-khashoggi-mord-journalist-ueberwachung-software-pegasus-saudi-arabien Jamal Khashoggi: Der Anschlag nach dem Mord]||[[NSO]] / [[SA]] | ||
+ | |- | ||
+ | |} | ||
+ | |||
+ | == 2020 == | ||
{|border=1 | {|border=1 | ||
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|Date||Source||Title||Tags | |Date||Source||Title||Tags | ||
|- | |- | ||
− | | | + | |20200329||theguardian.com||[https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/29/revealed-saudis-suspected-of-phone-spying-campaign-in-us Saudi Arabia: Revealed: Saudis suspected of phone spying campaign in US - Exclusive: Whistleblower’s data suggests millions of tracking requests sent over four-month period]||[[SS7 Monitoring]] / [[SA]] |
|- | |- | ||
|} | |} | ||
+ | |||
+ | == 2019 == | ||
+ | |||
+ | {|border=1 | ||
+ | |- | ||
+ | |Date||Source||Title||Tags | ||
+ | |- | ||
+ | |20190321||nytimes.com||[https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/21/us/politics/government-hackers-nso-darkmatter.html A New Age of Warfare: How Internet Mercenaries Do Battle for Authoritarian Governments - Sophisticated surveillance, once the domain of world powers, is increasingly available on the private market. Smaller countries are seizing on the tools — sometimes for darker purposes.]||[[NSO]] / [[DARKMATTER]] / [[SA]] / [[BLACK CUBE]] / [[PSY-GROUP]] / [[HULIO, SHALEV]] / [[LAVIE, OMRI]] / [[PEGASUS]] / [[AE]] | ||
+ | |- | ||
+ | |} | ||
+ | |||
+ | == 2018 == | ||
+ | |||
+ | {|border=1 | ||
+ | |- | ||
+ | |Date||Source||Title||Tags | ||
+ | |- | ||
+ | |20181107||haaretz.com||[https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-israeli-spyware-was-used-to-track-saudi-journalist-khashoggi-edward-snowden-says-1.6633745 Snowden: Israeli Firm's Spyware Was Used to Track Khashoggi]||[[NSO]] / [[SA]] | ||
+ | |- | ||
+ | |} | ||
+ | |||
+ | == 2015 == | ||
+ | |||
+ | {|border=1 | ||
+ | |- | ||
+ | |Date||Source||Title||Tags | ||
+ | |- | ||
+ | |20150710||wikileaks.org||[https://wikileaks.org/hackingteam/emails/?q=%22gov.sa%22&mfrom=&mto=&title=¬itle=&date=&nofrom=¬o=&count=50&sort=0#searchresult Hacking Team / Search Term "gov.sa"]||[[HACKINGTEAM]] / [[SA]] | ||
+ | |- | ||
+ | |20150710||wikileaks.org||[https://wikileaks.org/hackingteam/emails/emailid/144932 HACKINGTEAM: /etc/LISTA.txt]||[[HACKINGTEAM]] / [[US]] / [[NL]] / [[BY]] / [[MY]] / [[TR]] / [[SA]] / [[KW]] / [[IN]] / [[ID]] / [[AE]] / [[GR]] / [[SG]] / [[CZ]] / [[IT]] / [[DE]] / [[FR]] / [[NO]] / [[RS]] / [[CY]] / [[LT]] / [[ZA]] / [[HU]] / [[PL]] / [[DK]] / [[NZ]] / [[ZW]] / [[SI]] / [[KR]] / [[VA]] / [[CH]] / [[ES]] / [[CA]] / [[MT]] / [[UY]] / [[VN]] / [[BG]] / [[KZ]] / [[MO]] / [[HR]] / [[GT]] / [[QA]] / [[AT]] / [[SB]] / [[JP]] / [[RO]] / [[NA]] / [[FI]] / [[SE]] / [[RU]] / [[BN]] / [[LB]] / [[GH]] | ||
+ | |- | ||
+ | |} | ||
+ | |||
+ | == 2014 == | ||
+ | |||
+ | {|border=1 | ||
+ | |- | ||
+ | |Date||Source||Title||Tags | ||
+ | |- | ||
+ | |20141031||rt.com||[http://rt.com/news/201055-spyware-bypassing-encryption-report/ Bypassing encryption: Italian firm ‘sells global spyware to police, govts]||[[HACKINGTEAM]] / [[ET]] / [[KZ]] / [[SA]] / [[MX]] / [[OM]] | ||
+ | |- | ||
+ | |20140726||rt.com||[http://rt.com/usa/175712-snowden-nsa-saudi-partnership/ NSA partnering with Saudi regime ‒ Snowden leak]||[[SA]] / [[NSA]] / [[CIA]] | ||
+ | |- | ||
+ | |20140725||documentcloud.org||[http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1236112/saudi-arabia-information-paper.pdf NSA-Document 20130408: NSA Intelligence Relationship with Saudi Arabia]||[[SA]] / [[NSA]] / [[CIA]] | ||
+ | |- | ||
+ | |20140725||firstlook.org||[https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/07/25/nsas-new-partner-spying-saudi-arabias-brutal-state-police/ The NSA’s New Partner in Spying: Saudi Arabia’s Brutal State Police]||[[SA]] / [[NSA]] / [[CIA]] | ||
+ | |- | ||
+ | |20140619||rt.com||[http://rt.com/usa/167132-nsa-snowden-rampart-cable/ NSA uses 33 countries to intercept web traffic – Snowden Files]||[[NSA]] / [[RAMPART-A]] / [[US]] / [[CA]] / [[NZ]] / [[GB]] / [[DZ]] / [[AT]] / [[BE]] / [[HR]] / [[CZ]] / [[DK]] / [[ET]] / [[FI]] / [[FR]] / [[DE]] / [[GR]] / [[HU]] / [[IN]] / [[IL]] / [[IT]] / [[JP]] / [[JO]] / [[KR]] / [[MK]] / [[NL]] / [[NO]] / [[PK]] / [[PL]] / [[RO]] / [[SA]] / [[SG]] / [[ES]] / [[SE]] / [[TW]] / [[TH]] / [[TN]] / [[TR]] / [[AE]] | ||
+ | |- | ||
+ | |20140618||firstlook.org||[https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/06/18/nsa-surveillance-secret-cable-partners-revealed-rampart-a/ How Secret Partners Expand NSA’s Surveillance Dragnet]||[[NSA]] / [[RAMPART-A]] / [[US]] / [[CA]] / [[NZ]] / [[GB]] / [[DZ]] / [[AT]] / [[BE]] / [[HR]] / [[CZ]] / [[DK]] / [[ET]] / [[FI]] / [[FR]] / [[DE]] / [[GR]] / [[HU]] / [[IN]] / [[IL]] / [[IT]] / [[JP]] / [[JO]] / [[KR]] / [[MK]] / [[NL]] / [[NO]] / [[PK]] / [[PL]] / [[RO]] / [[SA]] / [[SG]] / [[ES]] / [[SE]] / [[TW]] / [[TH]] / [[TN]] / [[TR]] / [[AE]] | ||
+ | |- | ||
+ | |20140217||citizenlab.org||[https://citizenlab.org/2014/02/mapping-hacking-teams-untraceable-spyware/ Mapping Hacking Team’s “Untraceable” Spyware]||[[HACKINGTEAM]] / [[AZ]] / [[CO]] / [[EG]] / [[ET]] / [[HU]] / [[IT]] / [[KZ]] / [[KR]] / [[MY]] / [[MX]] / [[MA]] / [[NG]] / [[OM]] / [[PA]] / [[PL]] / [[SA]] / [[SD]] / [[TH]] / [[TR]] / [[AE]] / [[UZ]] | ||
+ | |- | ||
+ | |} | ||
+ | |||
+ | == 2013 == | ||
+ | |||
+ | {|border=1 | ||
+ | |- | ||
+ | |Date||Source||Title||Tags | ||
+ | |- | ||
+ | |20131006||nzz.ch||[http://www.nzz.ch/nzzas/nzz-am-sonntag/ueberwachungs-software-fuer-saudiarabien-1.18162783 Heikles Geschäft: Überwachungs-Software für Saudiarabien - Die Firma von Ruedi Noser verkauft Überwachungs- Software ins autokratische Saudiarabien. Der FDP- Nationalrat sieht darin kein Problem.]||[[CH]] / [[NEXUS TELECOM]] / [[SA]] | ||
+ | |- | ||
+ | |20130904||wikileaks.org||[http://www.wikileaks.org/spyfiles/docs/HACKINGTEAM-2011-MostMaan-en.pdf HACKINGTEAM: Mostapaha Maana]||[[HACKINGTEAM]] / [[MAANA, MOSTAPHA]] / [[IT]] / [[CH]] / [[US]] / [[MA]] / [[MY]] / [[SG]] / [[LB]] / [[NL]] / [[FR]] / [[EG]] / [[AE]] / [[TR]] / [[DE]] / [[SA]] / [[QA]] / [[SD]] / [[CZ]] / [[OM]] | ||
+ | |- | ||
+ | |20130802||cryptome.org||[http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-x-keyscore-servers.htm NSA X-KEYSCORE Server Sites]||[[XKEYSCORE]] / [[US]] / [[MX]] / [[HN]] / [[CR]] / [[PA]] / [[VE]] / [[CO]] / [[EC]] / [[BR]] / [[GB]] / [[FR]] / [[DE]] / [[AT]] / [[IT]] / [[ES]] / [[PL]] / [[BY]] / [[RU]] / [[RO]] / [[GR]] / [[CZ]] / [[DZ]] / [[MA]] / [[EG]] / [[SD]] / [[SO]] / [[CM]] / [[NA]] / [[ZW]] / [[SA]] / [[TR]] / [[IQ]] / [[KW]] / [[BH]] / [[QA]] / [[AE]] / [[UZ]] / [[KG]] / [[AF]] / [[PK]] / [[IN]] / [[JP]] / [[CN]] / [[PH]] / [[MM]] / [[TH]] / [[KH]] / [[MY]] / [[AU]] / [[NZ]] | ||
+ | |- | ||
+ | |20130513||thoughtcrime.org||[http://thoughtcrime.org/blog/saudi-surveillance/ A Saudi Arabia Telecom's Surveillance Pitch]||[[SA]] | ||
+ | |- | ||
+ | |20130425||securelist.com||[https://www.securelist.com/en/analysis/204792290/Spyware_HackingTeam Spyware. HackingTeam]||[[HACKINGTEAM]] / [[MX]] / [[IT]] / [[VN]] / [[AE]] / [[IQ]] / [[LB]] / [[MA]] / [[PA]] / [[TJ]] / [[IN]] / [[IR]] / [[SA]] / [[KR]] / [[ES]] / [[PL]] / [[TR]] / [[AR]] / [[CA]] / [[ML]] / [[OM]] / [[CN]] / [[US]] / [[KZ]] / [[EG]] / [[UA]] / [[UZ]] / [[CO]] / [[TW]] / [[BR]] / [[RU]] / [[KG]] / [[GB]] / [[BH]] / [[ET]] / [[ID]] / [[DE]] / [[LY]] | ||
+ | |- | ||
+ | |20130312||bugbrother.blog.lemonde.fr||[http://bugbrother.blog.lemonde.fr/2013/03/12/amesys-les-documents-qui-impliquent-ziad-takieddine-et-philippe-vannier-le-pdg-de-bull/ Amesys: les documents qui impliquent Ziad Takieddine et Philippe Vannier, le PDG de Bull]||[[AMESYS]] / [[MA]] / [[AE]] / [[GA]] / [[SA]] / [[KZ]] / [[LY]] | ||
+ | |- | ||
+ | |20130127||munkschool.utoronto.ca||[http://munkschool.utoronto.ca/canadacentre/research/planet-blue-coat-mapping-global-censorship-and-surveillance-tools/ PLANET BLUE COAT: MAPPING GLOBAL CENSORSHIP AND SURVEILLANCE TOOLS]||[[BLUECOAT]] / [[EG]] / [[KW]] / [[QA]] / [[SA]] / [[AE]] / [[AF]] / [[BH]] / [[CN]] / [[IN]] / [[ID]] / [[IQ]] / [[KE]] / [[LB]] / [[MY]] / [[NG]] / [[RU]] / [[KR]] / [[SG]] / [[TH]] / [[TR]] / [[VE]] | ||
+ | |- | ||
+ | |} | ||
+ | |||
+ | == 2011 == | ||
+ | |||
+ | {|border=1 | ||
+ | |- | ||
+ | |Date||Source||Title||Tags | ||
+ | |- | ||
+ | |01.06.2011||Wall Street Journal||[http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304520804576345970862420038.html Mideast Uses Western Tools to Battle the Skype Rebellion]||[[SKYPE|Skype]] [[FINFISHER|Finfisher]] [[GAMMA|Gamma]] [[EG|Egypt]] [[OM|Oman]] [[SA|Saudi Arabia]] [[CN|China]] | ||
+ | |- | ||
+ | |} | ||
+ | |||
+ | = Unconfirmed Rumors = | ||
+ | |||
+ | * [[FINFISHER]] said to have been sold to [[SA]] Government, [[mailto:mail@buggedplanet.info Confirmation needed]] | ||
+ | |||
+ | [[Category:Countries]] [[Category:SA]] |
Latest revision as of 19:57, 19 July 2021
SAUDI ARABIA
Intel Environment
Military Alliance | |
Interior Intelligence Services | |
Exterior Intelligence Services | |
Military Intelligence Services | |
SIGINT/COMINT Alliances |
Telco/Carrier/ISP Environment
Type | Name | Ownership | Main Office | URL | Notes |
GSM 900 | Etihad Etisalat Company (Mobily) | Etisalat | |||
3G 2100 | Etihad Etisalat Company (Mobily) | Etisalat | |||
GSM 900/1800 | MTC Saudi Arabia (Zain Saudi Arabia) | Zain | |||
3G 2100 | MTC Saudi Arabia (Zain Saudi Arabia) | Zain | |||
GSM 900 | Saudi Telecom Company (STC) | ||||
3G 2100 | Saudi Telecom Company (STC) | ||||
TD-LTE 2300 | Saudi Telecom Company (STC) |
Transnational Cables and Connections
Type | Name | Ownership | Connecting Point A | Connection Points B | URL/Notes |
3,84 Tbs | EIG | Tripoli (LY) / Abu Talat (EG) / Al Fujaurah (AE) / Barka (OM) / Djibouti (DJ) / Gibraltar (GI) / Jeddah (SA) / London (GB) / Marseille (FR) / Monaco (MC) / Mumbai (IN) / Sesimbra (PT) / Widemouth Bay (GB) / Zaferana (EG) | Operator WP | ||
480 Gbits/s | SEA-ME-WE-3 | Norden (DE) / Oostende (BE) / Goonhilly (GB) / Penmarch (FR) / Sesimbra (PT) / Tetuan (MA) / Mazara del Vallo (IT) / Chania (GR) / Marmaris (TR) / Yeroskipou (CY) / Alexandria (EG) / Suez (EG) / Jeddah (SA) / Djibouti (DJ) / Muscat (OM) / Fujairah (AE) / Karachi (PK) / Mumbai (IN) / Cochin (IN) / Mount Lavinia (LK) / Pyapon (MM) / Satun (TH) / Penang, (MY) (Where it meets the SAFE and the FLAG cables.) / Medan (IN) / Tuas (SG) / Jakarta (IN) / Perth (AU) / Mersing (MY) / Tungku (BN) / Da Nang (VN) / Batangas (PH) / Taipa (MO) / Deep Water Bay (HK) / Shantou (CN) / Fangshan (TW) / Toucheng (TW) / Shanghai (CN) / Keoje (KR) / Okinawa, (JP) | WP |
SIGINT/COMINT Stations and Operators
Name | Location | Operator | Capabilities |
Araz | SA-operated "accommodation site" that provides occasional SIGINT product to the US INSCOM | ||
Khafji | SA-operated "accommodation site" that provides occasional SIGINT product to the US INSCOM |
Privacy Related Legislation
LI Legislation
SIGINT/COMINT Legal Grounds
Vendor Appearance
- 2013: HACKINGTEAM see securelist.com Report 20130425
Articles / Events / Situations
2021
Date | Souce | Title | Tags |
20210718 | theguardian.com | Saudis behind NSO spyware attack on Jamal Khashoggi’s family, leak suggests | NSO / SA |
20210718 | zeit.de | Jamal Khashoggi: Der Anschlag nach dem Mord | NSO / SA |
2020
Date | Source | Title | Tags |
20200329 | theguardian.com | Saudi Arabia: Revealed: Saudis suspected of phone spying campaign in US - Exclusive: Whistleblower’s data suggests millions of tracking requests sent over four-month period | SS7 Monitoring / SA |
2019
2018
Date | Source | Title | Tags |
20181107 | haaretz.com | Snowden: Israeli Firm's Spyware Was Used to Track Khashoggi | NSO / SA |
2015
Date | Source | Title | Tags |
20150710 | wikileaks.org | Hacking Team / Search Term "gov.sa" | HACKINGTEAM / SA |
20150710 | wikileaks.org | HACKINGTEAM: /etc/LISTA.txt | HACKINGTEAM / US / NL / BY / MY / TR / SA / KW / IN / ID / AE / GR / SG / CZ / IT / DE / FR / NO / RS / CY / LT / ZA / HU / PL / DK / NZ / ZW / SI / KR / VA / CH / ES / CA / MT / UY / VN / BG / KZ / MO / HR / GT / QA / AT / SB / JP / RO / NA / FI / SE / RU / BN / LB / GH |
2014
2013
2011
Date | Source | Title | Tags |
01.06.2011 | Wall Street Journal | Mideast Uses Western Tools to Battle the Skype Rebellion | Skype Finfisher Gamma Egypt Oman Saudi Arabia China |
Unconfirmed Rumors
- FINFISHER said to have been sold to SA Government, [Confirmation needed]