Difference between revisions of "SA"
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= Articles / Events / Situations = | = Articles / Events / Situations = | ||
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| + | == 2021 == | ||
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| + | {|border=1 | ||
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| + | |Date||Souce||Title||Tags | ||
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| + | |20210718||theguardian.com||[https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jul/18/nso-spyware-used-to-target-family-of-jamal-khashoggi-leaked-data-shows-saudis-pegasus Saudis behind NSO spyware attack on Jamal Khashoggi’s family, leak suggests]||[[NSO]] / [[SA]] | ||
| + | |- | ||
| + | |20210718||zeit.de||[https://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2021-07/jamal-khashoggi-mord-journalist-ueberwachung-software-pegasus-saudi-arabien Jamal Khashoggi: Der Anschlag nach dem Mord]||[[NSO]] / [[SA]] | ||
| + | |- | ||
| + | |} | ||
| + | |||
| + | == 2020 == | ||
| + | |||
| + | {|border=1 | ||
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| + | |Date||Source||Title||Tags | ||
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| + | |20200329||theguardian.com||[https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/29/revealed-saudis-suspected-of-phone-spying-campaign-in-us Saudi Arabia: Revealed: Saudis suspected of phone spying campaign in US - Exclusive: Whistleblower’s data suggests millions of tracking requests sent over four-month period]||[[SS7 Monitoring]] / [[SA]] | ||
| + | |- | ||
| + | |} | ||
| + | |||
| + | == 2019 == | ||
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| + | {|border=1 | ||
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| + | |Date||Source||Title||Tags | ||
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| + | |20190321||nytimes.com||[https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/21/us/politics/government-hackers-nso-darkmatter.html A New Age of Warfare: How Internet Mercenaries Do Battle for Authoritarian Governments - Sophisticated surveillance, once the domain of world powers, is increasingly available on the private market. Smaller countries are seizing on the tools — sometimes for darker purposes.]||[[NSO]] / [[DARKMATTER]] / [[SA]] / [[BLACK CUBE]] / [[PSY-GROUP]] / [[HULIO, SHALEV]] / [[LAVIE, OMRI]] / [[PEGASUS]] / [[AE]] | ||
| + | |- | ||
| + | |} | ||
== 2018 == | == 2018 == | ||
Latest revision as of 19:57, 19 July 2021
SAUDI ARABIA
Intel Environment
| Military Alliance | |
| Interior Intelligence Services | |
| Exterior Intelligence Services | |
| Military Intelligence Services | |
| SIGINT/COMINT Alliances |
Telco/Carrier/ISP Environment
| Type | Name | Ownership | Main Office | URL | Notes |
| GSM 900 | Etihad Etisalat Company (Mobily) | Etisalat | |||
| 3G 2100 | Etihad Etisalat Company (Mobily) | Etisalat | |||
| GSM 900/1800 | MTC Saudi Arabia (Zain Saudi Arabia) | Zain | |||
| 3G 2100 | MTC Saudi Arabia (Zain Saudi Arabia) | Zain | |||
| GSM 900 | Saudi Telecom Company (STC) | ||||
| 3G 2100 | Saudi Telecom Company (STC) | ||||
| TD-LTE 2300 | Saudi Telecom Company (STC) |
Transnational Cables and Connections
| Type | Name | Ownership | Connecting Point A | Connection Points B | URL/Notes |
| 3,84 Tbs | EIG | Tripoli (LY) / Abu Talat (EG) / Al Fujaurah (AE) / Barka (OM) / Djibouti (DJ) / Gibraltar (GI) / Jeddah (SA) / London (GB) / Marseille (FR) / Monaco (MC) / Mumbai (IN) / Sesimbra (PT) / Widemouth Bay (GB) / Zaferana (EG) | Operator WP | ||
| 480 Gbits/s | SEA-ME-WE-3 | Norden (DE) / Oostende (BE) / Goonhilly (GB) / Penmarch (FR) / Sesimbra (PT) / Tetuan (MA) / Mazara del Vallo (IT) / Chania (GR) / Marmaris (TR) / Yeroskipou (CY) / Alexandria (EG) / Suez (EG) / Jeddah (SA) / Djibouti (DJ) / Muscat (OM) / Fujairah (AE) / Karachi (PK) / Mumbai (IN) / Cochin (IN) / Mount Lavinia (LK) / Pyapon (MM) / Satun (TH) / Penang, (MY) (Where it meets the SAFE and the FLAG cables.) / Medan (IN) / Tuas (SG) / Jakarta (IN) / Perth (AU) / Mersing (MY) / Tungku (BN) / Da Nang (VN) / Batangas (PH) / Taipa (MO) / Deep Water Bay (HK) / Shantou (CN) / Fangshan (TW) / Toucheng (TW) / Shanghai (CN) / Keoje (KR) / Okinawa, (JP) | WP |
SIGINT/COMINT Stations and Operators
| Name | Location | Operator | Capabilities |
| Araz | SA-operated "accommodation site" that provides occasional SIGINT product to the US INSCOM | ||
| Khafji | SA-operated "accommodation site" that provides occasional SIGINT product to the US INSCOM |
Privacy Related Legislation
LI Legislation
SIGINT/COMINT Legal Grounds
Vendor Appearance
- 2013: HACKINGTEAM see securelist.com Report 20130425
Articles / Events / Situations
2021
| Date | Souce | Title | Tags |
| 20210718 | theguardian.com | Saudis behind NSO spyware attack on Jamal Khashoggi’s family, leak suggests | NSO / SA |
| 20210718 | zeit.de | Jamal Khashoggi: Der Anschlag nach dem Mord | NSO / SA |
2020
| Date | Source | Title | Tags |
| 20200329 | theguardian.com | Saudi Arabia: Revealed: Saudis suspected of phone spying campaign in US - Exclusive: Whistleblower’s data suggests millions of tracking requests sent over four-month period | SS7 Monitoring / SA |
2019
2018
| Date | Source | Title | Tags |
| 20181107 | haaretz.com | Snowden: Israeli Firm's Spyware Was Used to Track Khashoggi | NSO / SA |
2015
| Date | Source | Title | Tags |
| 20150710 | wikileaks.org | Hacking Team / Search Term "gov.sa" | HACKINGTEAM / SA |
| 20150710 | wikileaks.org | HACKINGTEAM: /etc/LISTA.txt | HACKINGTEAM / US / NL / BY / MY / TR / SA / KW / IN / ID / AE / GR / SG / CZ / IT / DE / FR / NO / RS / CY / LT / ZA / HU / PL / DK / NZ / ZW / SI / KR / VA / CH / ES / CA / MT / UY / VN / BG / KZ / MO / HR / GT / QA / AT / SB / JP / RO / NA / FI / SE / RU / BN / LB / GH |
2014
2013
2011
| Date | Source | Title | Tags |
| 01.06.2011 | Wall Street Journal | Mideast Uses Western Tools to Battle the Skype Rebellion | Skype Finfisher Gamma Egypt Oman Saudi Arabia China |
Unconfirmed Rumors
- FINFISHER said to have been sold to SA Government, [Confirmation needed]
