Difference between revisions of "SA"
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| + | |20130802||cryptome.org||[http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-x-keyscore-servers.htm NSA X-KEYSCORE Server Sites]||[[XKEYSCORE]] / [[US]] / [[MX]] / [[HN]] / [[CR]] / [[PA]] / [[VE]] / [[CO]] / [[EC]] / [[BR]] / [[GB]] / [[FR]] / [[DE]] / [[AT]] / [[IT]] / [[ES]] / [[PL]] / [[BY]] / [[RU]] / [[RO]] / [[GR]] / [[CZ]] / [[DZ]] / [[MA]] / [[EG]] / [[SD]] / [[SO]] / [[CM]] / [[NA]] / [[ZW]] / [[SA]] / [[TR]] / [[IQ]] / [[KW]] / [[BH]] / [[QA]] / [[AE]] / [[UZ]] / [[KG]] / [[AF]] / [[PK]] / [[IN]] / [[JP]] / [[CN]] / [[PH]] / [[MM]] / [[TH]] / [[KH]] / [[MY]] / [[AU]] / [[NZ]] | ||
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|20130513||thoughtcrime.org||[http://thoughtcrime.org/blog/saudi-surveillance/ A Saudi Arabia Telecom's Surveillance Pitch]||[[SA]] | |20130513||thoughtcrime.org||[http://thoughtcrime.org/blog/saudi-surveillance/ A Saudi Arabia Telecom's Surveillance Pitch]||[[SA]] | ||
Revision as of 08:53, 4 August 2013
SAUDI ARABIA
Intel Environment
| Military Alliance | |
| Interior Intelligence Services | |
| Exterior Intelligence Services | |
| Military Intelligence Services | |
| SIGINT/COMINT Alliances |
Telco/Carrier/ISP Environment
| Type | Name | Ownership | Main Office | URL | Notes |
| GSM 900 | Etihad Etisalat Company (Mobily) | Etisalat | |||
| 3G 2100 | Etihad Etisalat Company (Mobily) | Etisalat | |||
| GSM 900/1800 | MTC Saudi Arabia (Zain Saudi Arabia) | Zain | |||
| 3G 2100 | MTC Saudi Arabia (Zain Saudi Arabia) | Zain | |||
| GSM 900 | Saudi Telecom Company (STC) | ||||
| 3G 2100 | Saudi Telecom Company (STC) | ||||
| TD-LTE 2300 | Saudi Telecom Company (STC) |
Transnational Cables and Connections
| Type | Name | Ownership | Connecting Point A | Connection Points B | URL/Notes |
| 3,84 Tbs | EIG | Tripoli (LY) / Abu Talat (EG) / Al Fujaurah (AE) / Barka (OM) / Djibouti (DJ) / Gibraltar (GI) / Jeddah (SA) / London (GB) / Marseille (FR) / Monaco (MC) / Mumbai (IN) / Sesimbra (PT) / Widemouth Bay (GB) / Zaferana (EG) | Operator WP | ||
| 480 Gbits/s | SEA-ME-WE-3 | Norden (DE) / Oostende (BE) / Goonhilly (GB) / Penmarch (FR) / Sesimbra (PT) / Tetuan (MA) / Mazara del Vallo (IT) / Chania (GR) / Marmaris (TR) / Yeroskipou (CY) / Alexandria (EG) / Suez (EG) / Jeddah (SA) / Djibouti (DJ) / Muscat (OM) / Fujairah (AE) / Karachi (PK) / Mumbai (IN) / Cochin (IN) / Mount Lavinia (LK) / Pyapon (MM) / Satun (TH) / Penang, (MY) (Where it meets the SAFE and the FLAG cables.) / Medan (IN) / Tuas (SG) / Jakarta (IN) / Perth (AU) / Mersing (MY) / Tungku (BN) / Da Nang (VN) / Batangas (PH) / Taipa (MO) / Deep Water Bay (HK) / Shantou (CN) / Fangshan (TW) / Toucheng (TW) / Shanghai (CN) / Keoje (KR) / Okinawa, (JP) | WP |
SIGINT/COMINT Stations and Operators
| Name | Location | Operator | Capabilities |
| Araz | SA-operated "accommodation site" that provides occasional SIGINT product to the US INSCOM | ||
| Khafji | SA-operated "accommodation site" that provides occasional SIGINT product to the US INSCOM |
Privacy Related Legislation
LI Legislation
SIGINT/COMINT Legal Grounds
Vendor Appearance
- 2013: HACKINGTEAM see securelist.com Report 20130425
Articles / Events / Situations
Unconfirmed Rumors
- FINFISHER said to have been sold to SA Government, [Confirmation needed]
